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Professor Garrett’s impressive empirical analysis of the first 200 post conviction DNA 
exonerations in the United States (“Garrett Study”) has the potential to affect contemporary 
debates surrounding our nation’s criminal justice system. This Response explores this potential 
by harnessing the Study’s data in support of arguments for and against a contested doctrinal 
proposition—that guilt-based harmless error rules should never apply in death penalty appeals.  
My analysis starts with the premise that the Study’s real world impact will necessarily depend on 
how jurists, politicians, and scholars extrapolate the explanatory power of the data beyond the 
200 cases themselves. While critics of contemporary criminal justice policies will likely see 
Professor Garrett’s data as revealing the tip of an iceberg of deeper structural flaws, defenders of 
the status quo will predictably resist generalizations from this closed data set to any larger 
picture of criminal justice administration. Much therefore rides on the perceived inductive reach 
of these 200 cases. 
Perhaps wisely, Professor Garrett declines to engage in a specific evaluation of his study’s 
implications in terms of the number of innocents still in prison, except to assert cautiously that 
known innocence cases “represent the tip of an iceberg.”1 Curious readers might nonetheless 
persist in asking: just how much larger is the phenomenon that these cases represent? I suggest 
that this line of inquiry is not a particularly useful one because the empirical question it asks is 
essentially unanswerable. Given that conclusive forensic proof of guilt or innocence remains 
unavailable in the overwhelming majority of convictions, any attempt to precisely quantify the 
data’s representativeness inevitably will rest on guesses (educated or not) concerning either 
overall system error rates or the raw numbers of undiscovered wrongful convictions. 
Rather than attempt such quasiempirical triangulations, I propose instead to test the explanatory 
power of the Garrett Study via a rhetorical experiment. Specifically, I hope to gauge the practical 
reach of the Study by examining its persuasive impact when called into service to support a 
particular and contested proposition—that guilt-based harmless error rules should never apply in 
death penalty appeals.2 The experiment is designed to test what persuasive “truths” might 
emerge from the Study when it is subjected to the crucible of an imagined adversarial process. 
Though the actual proposition chosen for debate matters, the assumption animating the 
experiment is that dialectical process and rhetorical dynamics would cause similar “truths” to 
emerge even when contesting different propositions. 
The crux of the rhetorical experiment has three stages, mirroring the stages in a typical litigation 
briefing. Reasoning from the Garrett Study, I first advance imagined prima facie arguments in 
support of the proposition that guilt-based harmless error rules should never apply in death 
penalty appeals. Second, I respond to the prima facie case with counterarguments focusing on 
potential and perceived weaknesses in the Study. Third, I offer a reply to rehabilitate the original 
proposition and the relevance of the Study. After the arguments are submitted, I conclude the 
experiment by attempting to assume a neutral stance and analyzing the broader rhetorical and 
practical implications of the imagined exchange.  
Prima Facie Case: Guilt-Based Harmless Error Rules Should Never Apply in Death 
Penalty Appeals 
Guilt-based harmless error rules empower courts to deny relief to criminal appellants despite 
finding legal error in the proceedings that led to conviction. As Professor Garrett observes, these 
guilt-based rules surface in various doctrinal inquiries such as the Chapman test (which excuses 
constitutional error at trial if the state shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the guilty verdict) or the Strickland test (which precludes a finding of constitutional 
error when ineffective assistance of counsel failed to prejudice the outcome due to the evidence 
of the client’s guilt).3 Harmless error rules exist to limit or prevent reversals of otherwise reliable 
convictions or sentences on technicalities. 
A critical assumption that must underlie the creation and application of guilt-based harmless 
error rules is that reviewing courts can effectively judge the reliability of a conviction 
independent of any legal error that may have occurred in the proceedings below. By definition, 
harmless error rules only come into play when a fairness-implicating error has occurred. 
Ultimately, then, a conclusion that a conviction is reliable represents a judgment on the 
substantive correctness of the guilty verdict or guilty plea. It then follows that guilt-based 
harmless error rules must assume that courts can effectively judge the guilt or innocence of an 
appellant. 
Professor Garrett’s study of the first 200 post conviction DNA exonerations in the United States 
undermines this assumption. At the most basic level, all 200 cases represent discrete instances 
where the courts failed to detect innocence. Every one of these 200 individuals had his or her 
conviction sustained on appeal and was not exonerated until after post conviction DNA testing 
yielded exculpatory results and/or a “hit” to a third party in a DNA database. Without question, 
courts have confidently but mistakenly judged actually innocent appellants to be guilty. 
The Garrett Study further allows for a nuanced analysis of the precise manner in which the courts 
went astray. In 133 of 200 cases, courts issued nonsummary written opinions explaining their 
reasons for granting or denying relief. A key finding of the Study is that in 18 of these 133 
cases—14%—courts actually did reverse and vacate the innocent person’s conviction. Although 
these 18 reversals were all sustained on appeal, they do not represent exoneration by the courts. 
In 12 of these 18 cases, the person was retried and reconvicted, and only later exonerated by 
DNA testing. In the remaining 6 cases, exculpatory DNA results were obtained while the person 
awaited his retrial.4 Nonetheless, the 14% reversal rate represents a baseline in the data set 
where the court system “got it right” at least once. 
Obviously, this 14% success rate pales in comparison to its complimentary 86% failure rate. 
Even more revealing, however, is that in 43 of the 133 cases with written decisions—32%—
courts made adverse guilt-based harmless error rulings in the course of denying relief.5 Looking 
more closely, Professor Garrett reveals that in 23 of these 43 harmless error cases, the court 
actually found an underlying legal or constitutional error, but then denied relief on harmlessness 
or lack-of-prejudice grounds.6 In other words, application of guilt-based rules caused 23 
innocent individuals (17% of the 133 cases) to languish in prison despite judicial recognition that 
the proceedings that led to their conviction were in fact flawed and unfair. 
These findings should give pause to even the most ardent supporters of the death penalty. Guilt-
based harmless error rules permit the state to execute an individual in the face of legal error. This 
represents a judgment that the evidence of guilt is so strong that it outweighs or excuses admitted 
unfairness or technical deficiency and therefore permits taking the life of the condemned. Yet 
Professor Garrett has shown that courts demonstrate a guilt-confirming bias even when 
reviewing cases of actually innocent defendants. More courts identified reversible error but 
excused the failing on (incorrect) harmlessness grounds than identified error and permitted 
reversal—even if reconviction ultimately ensued. 
While it may be unrealistic (though not unreasonable) to demand zero errors and execution of 
only the guilty, it seems entirely reasonable to require that no execution proceed if a court has 
identified reversible error. After all, “technical” procedural protections exist only because of 
their presumed role in enhancing the truth-seeking process of trial and in preventing wrongful 
conviction. Professor Garrett has demonstrated that courts can be seriously wrong when they 
ignore the legal recognition of errors in the truth-seeking process and substitute their own 
subjective assessment of guilt.  
Response: Juries Real Source of Error; Capital Review Adequate 
Harmless error rules cannot be strictly equated with an affirmative appellate judgment of guilt or 
innocence. Rather, harmless error analysis recognizes that fact finders’ verdicts should not be 
disturbed for any or all procedural defects. In this way, harmless error rules actually represent 
deference to the judgment of juries more than confidence in the record-reviewing power of 
appellate courts. The real problem identified by Professor Garrett’s study is that juries can make 
mistakes. However, this problem cannot be solved by tinkering with guilt-based harmless error 
rules. 
Although Professor Garrett devotes much attention to the path of eventually-exonerated 
defendants’ appeals, the bottom line is that 191 of the 200 wrongful convictions in his Study—
96%—resulted from a fact finder’s verdict after trial; a mere 9 cases resulted from guilty pleas.7 
In 18 of the 200 cases, appellate courts judged legal error to be serious enough to disturb the 
jury’s judgment. However, as already cited, in 12 of these 18 reversals the innocent defendant 
was again convicted at trial. In other words, even when appellate courts get it right, the case will 
likely be returned to a jury for another chance to get it wrong. Professor Garrett’s study thus 
underscores a simple truth—juries are human and therefore fallible. Nonetheless, the reality 
remains that juries are a constitutionally required centerpiece of our criminal justice system. 
With respect to the specific question of harmless error in the death penalty context, Professor 
Garrett’s Study supports the proposition that appellate courts currently give capital cases the 
additional scrutiny they deserve. Although a 14% overall reversal rate has already been cited, 
Professor Garrett himself is careful to distinguish between innocent appellants’ reversal rates in 
capital versus noncapital cases. As it turns out, 12 of the 133 cases with written decisions in the 
data set were capital cases, and 7 of the 18 reversals with written decisions were also in capital 
cases, resulting in a capital reversal rate of 58%.8 This 58% attrition rate is similar to the 68% 
capital attrition rate found in all capital appeals from 1973 through 1995 in the landmark 
Liebman, Fagan, and West study.9 This high reversal rate therefore seems reliable and 
generalizable beyond Professor Garrett’s own narrow data set to the capital system at large. 
For present purposes, the germane bottom line from these two studies is that one can reasonably 
expect approximately 58–68% of all capital convictions to be reversed. The logical counterpart 
of this conclusion is that guilt-based harmless error rules will ultimately be ignored or overcome 
in a comfortable majority of all capital cases. Indeed, it is not clear in the Study how many 
capital cases, if any, were among the 23 cases where harmless error applied to defeat a 
meritorious claim. In short, the issue of guilt-based harmless error rules blocking relief for 
innocent appellants does not seem to be a significant problem in the capital context. 
Finally, the harmless error question needs to be understood in the context of courts granting 
relief for the actually guilty. In addition to a 58% capital reversal rate, Professor Garrett found a 
9% reversal rate for noncapital cases in the data set.10 Of course, nothing in Professor Garrett’s 
study directly suggests that a higher percentage of capital defendants are actually innocent than 
noncapital defendants. And nothing in the study suggests that anywhere near 58%–68% of 
people on death row are actually innocent, or that 9% of convicted rape, murder, and rape-
murder defendants in our system are actually innocent. Thus, it seems apparent that more 
defendants will obtain relief than are actually innocent. Put another way, despite the presence of 
the contested harmless error system, it appears that significant numbers of actually guilty 
defendants will obtain reversals. This suggests that harmless error rules may in fact be too 
lenient, and that the problem of actually guilty people unjustifiably earning relief is far more 
pronounced in the capital context. 
In sum, it appears that courts may already be disturbing jury judgments too frequently, and that 
harmless error rules should not be cast aside.  
Reply: Process Matters; Death Is Different 
Regardless of whether guilt-based harmless error rules are characterized as affirmative 
judgments or deference-based judgments, they still focus the court’s attention on the reliability of 
the verdict instead of the fairness of the process. While it may be true that juries bear the most 
responsibility for wrongful convictions, this cannot be a reason to defer to jury judgment in the 
face of procedural error. The point is that courts can competently judge process, and that fair 
process has an underappreciated instrumental value in truth seeking. Abolishing guilt-based error 
rules in capital appeals may not solve the problem of jury mistake, but it would prevent courts 
from potentially compounding such mistakes. 
It may well be that the unreliable application of harmless error rules is a more pronounced 
problem outside the capital context than within it. But this does not mean that the capital system 
is working properly. Indeed, a 58–68% reversal rate suggests that capital trials frequently suffer 
from intense flaws, and that appellate confidence in the system as a whole is not great.11 
Moreover, a higher reversal rate in capital cases does not challenge Professor Garrett’s basic 
finding that appellate courts frequently mistook innocent appellants for guilty ones. All 133 cases 
with written decisions in the Study were serious crimes—rapes, murders, and rape-murders—and 
in 67 of those cases (50%), courts (incorrectly) referred to appellant’s guilt.12 Disturbingly, in 
13 of these cases (10%), the court actually characterized the evidence of guilt as 
“overwhelming.”13 This suggests a powerful guilt-confirming bias. 
Regardless of how many capital defendants had adverse harmless error rulings made against 
them, the fact remains that at least 14 innocent men have walked off of death row only because 
post conviction DNA testing proved innocence that juries and courts failed to detect. This raw 
number is significant as it represents 14 concrete instances where the state came close to killing 
the wrong man. While it may be possible that truly guilty individuals have earned some kind of 
relief because their trials were unfair, Professor Garrett’s study should put an end to the horribly 
naïve conception that our death penalty system could never shed innocent blood. Since executing 
an innocent can never be harmless, guilt-based harmless error rules should never apply in death 
penalty appeals.  
Conclusion: Experimental Observations 
Although the particular arguments advanced for and against the proposition might easily have 
varied, this exchange evidences many rhetorical characteristics one would expect when the 
proposition debated calls upon empirical support for a question that is not strictly empirical. 
Doctrinal or moral premises behind guilt-based harmless error rules immediately become 
contested, and empirical interpretations of innocence data vary depending on prior doctrinal 
perspective. A 58% capital reversal rate can mean the system is catching errors or it can mean 
the system is constantly breaking, depending on whether one views the system as broken or 
functioning. 
A particular and revealing characteristic of the debate regarding this data set is the unknown (and 
unknowable) rate of wrongful conviction. Whether more actually guilty defendants win release 
than actually innocent people suffer incarceration or execution cannot be answered. The inability 
to answer this question naturally does not deter the use of statistics to buttress an argument that 
the rate is likely acceptably low or unacceptably high. Yet a rhetorical void is created without an 
empirical answer to the rate of wrongful conviction question, and this void leaves a more 
fundamental question unasked: What is an acceptable error rate in the administration of the death 
penalty? As a society, can we agree that it is acceptable that one innocent be killed for every 
hundred guilty men executed? Can we agree on one for one thousand? 
With the question reframed this way, it seems clear that the argument against harmless error 
rules in death penalty cases best rests on a nonempirical appeal to the value of an individual life 
and thus predicts the Reply’s closing focus on the 14 men released from death row.14 
Conversely, this reframing suggests that the argument in support of harmless error rules derives 
its greatest strength from an appeal to the specter of guilty individuals escaping just punishment. 
In the end, this experiment suggests that the illuminating power of Professor Garrett’s study will 
depend on our ability to honestly struggle with the ultimate nonempirical questions it raises. 
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